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RISKS OF SMALLHOLDER EXCLUSION 
FROM UPGRADING FOOD CHAINS
Guillaume Soullier1, Paule Moustier2 and Frédéric Lançon1
Poor smallholders in traditional food chains
In 2013, the extremely poor represented 10.7 percent of the 
world’s population (World Bank, 2016). Of these, 50.7 percent 
lived in sub-Saharan Africa and 33.4 percent in South Asia. Of 
extremely poor workers aged over 14, 65 percent worked in the 
agricultural sector (World Bank, 2016). 
Smallholders are characterised by limited productive assets, 
management implemented at the family level and an often 
informal legal status (Bélières et al., 2015). This definition mainly 
concerns agricultural producers, but it can be extended to 
downstream operators, who carry out trade, processing and 
retailing activities with limited assets. Smallholders include 
socially marginalised groups, such as women, young people 
and ethnic minorities. These groups have reduced access to 
resources and fewer opportunities than others (De La O Campos 
et al., 2018).
Smallholders operate in uncertain environments and have 
limited access to productive resources (Devaux et al., 2016). This 
constrains their innovation, quality management and access to 
output markets. As a result, they participate in traditional food 
chains, which provide products of heterogeneous quality and 
generate low incomes. This is particularly the case for domestic 
and staple chains.
The upgrading of value chains
Large agribusinesses are investing in new technologies in 
production, storage and processing, including in LI and LMI 
countries. They have access to bank credit, technology and 
information. They define the attributes of final products and 
develop new business models to control their supplies. They 
implement contract farming, which is “a sales arrangement 
between a farmer and a firm, agreed before production begins, 
which provides the farmer with resources or services” (Ton 
et al., 2018). Contract farming often includes the setting of 
standards, i.e. a set of quality criteria for product attributes. 
Some large agribusinesses also choose to control their supplies 
hierarchically. 
Large agri-industries are diverse in their origins, activities and the 
segments in which they operate. As a result, different patterns of 
upgrading coexist. The supermarket revolution relates to large-
scale investment in retailing, the centralisation of supply systems 
and the implementation of vertical coordination. The quiet 
revolution relates to investments in improved processing and 
storage, and direct sourcing from smallholder farmers (Reardon 
et al., 2012; Soullier and Moustier, 2018). 
S U M M A R Y
Large agri-industries fuel the upgrading of certain 
food chains. This chapter presents the risks of 
smallholders not benefitting from this upgrading. 
The first risk is that upgrading does not spread 
to all food value chains, generating territorial 
inequalities. The second is that the most endowed 
smallholders are included while the poorest are 
excluded. The third risk is that those smallholders 
who are included tend to be in a weak bargaining 
position against large agri-industries. As a result, 
most smallholders do not get higher incomes 
from upgrading food chains.
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CHAPTER 4.2
It is still unclear whether smallholders manage to 
grasp the opportunities offered by the upgrading 
of food chains. This chapter discusses the risks that 
smallholders do not benefit from the upgrading of 
value chains and questions the contribution of food 
chain upgrading to the reduction of poverty and 
inequality.
Risk 1: Upgrading does not affect 
all food value chains 
Upgrading does not affect all food value chains, 
contributing to territorial inequalities. Several factors 
in certain territories generate costs and uncertainty 
which discourage agri-industry investments (Barrett 
et al., 2012). These comprise infrastructure quality 
(such as roads, irrigation and storage), degree of 
insecurity, institutional context, agroecological 
conditions and proximity to markets for quality 
products.
As a result, many food chains are not upgrading. 
Several domestic food chains in sub-Saharan 
Africa have received little investment or innovation 
(Soullier and Moustier, 2013). Indeed, domestic 
chains target national demand, do not benefit from 
a shift in demand for quality products, face various 
uncertainties and generate little income. Some 
traditional chains may also disappear when faced 
with a reduction in demand and competition from 
imported products or from agribusinesses. This has 
been observed in the milk sector in Brazil, where 
60,000 small dairy farmers went out of business 
in the second half of the 1990s, unable to invest 
in pasteurisation (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002). 
Consequently, the unequal geographical coverage of 
upgrading food chains tends to increase inequalities 
between territories. This is particularly the case in 
some parts of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
which represent a major risk since these two regions 
are home to 84 percent of the world’s extremely poor 
population (cf. Chapter 4.3).
Risk 2: Less endowed smallholders 
are being excluded from upgrading 
food chains
Large agri-industries select business models and 
suppliers that best meet their quality standards and 
reduce their costs and uncertainties (Barrett et al., 
2012). They often prefer better endowed smallholders, 
who have access to technology, generate economies 
of scale and present lower transaction costs. For 
example, most farmers supplying supermarkets in 
Vietnam were found to be above the poverty level 
(Moustier et al., 2009). Poorer smallholders often do 
not have access to credit and cannot invest to meet 
agribusiness contract requirements. 
The number of smallholders included in upgrading 
chains is therefore very limited. Through a meta-
analysis of 26 case studies, Ton et al. (2018) have 
shown that in 61 percent of the cases studied contract 
farmers had larger landholdings or owned more non-
land assets than non-contracted farmers. However, 
exceptions do exist, particularly when operations 
are labour-intensive and collective action is possible 
(Reardon et al., 2009). But these cases are rare and 
in developing countries “the proportion of farm 
households involved in contract farming is probably 
in the range of 1-5 percent” (Devaux et al., 2016, p. 
136). While poorly documented, the inclusion of 
smallholders downstream may show similar results. 
In some cases, agri-industries fuel an increase in 
agricultural production and smallholders excluded 
from upgrading can continue their activities in 
traditional food chains. However, they remain stuck 
in low-income activities. In others, production does 
not increase sufficiently and smallholders risk being 
replaced by large agribusinesses. This has happened 
in some Asian countries, where medium and large 
millers replaced smaller ones (Reardon et al., 2012). 
In such situations, some become employees of large 
agri-industries (FAO, 2015) but not all, because these 
large agri-industries are capital-intensive rather than 
labour-intensive. Furthermore, smallholders do 
not necessarily gain higher incomes when they are 
employed. 
Risk 3: When included, smallholders 
may not always benefit
Upgrading may lead to asymmetries of power. Indeed, 
large companies integrate activities that generate the 
most added value and outsource those that are riskier 
and less profitable (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 
2005). They often outsource agricultural production 
to smallholder famers where contracts include risk-
transfer mechanisms. Large agribusinesses can also 
be opportunistic, with payment delays, no payment, 
purchasing price reductions or inappropriate rejection 
of products (Barrett et al., 2012). Some policies seek 
to balance power relationships in value chains, for 
example through multi-stakeholder platforms or 
inter-professional associations. However, multi-
stakeholder partnerships may also lead to exclusion 
practices (HLPE, 2018).
As a result, the incomes of those smallholders who 
are included may not improve. On average, contract 
farming increased farmers’ incomes by 38 percent, 
thanks to access to improved inputs and quality 
management (Ton et al., 2018). However, these figures 
hide a bias toward the studies showing positive 
impacts, which are more likely to be published and 
appreciated by donors and policy makers. 
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Nevertheless, some vertical coordination approaches 
can have no or negative impacts on smallholder 
welfare. For example, rice growers in Senegal 
committed to production contracts simply because 
it was their only way to fund rice growing, but they 
received an income almost 13 percent lower than 
producers using bank credit and marketing paddy 
with spot transactions. Why? Because the production 
contract included high interest and insurance rates 
(Soullier and Moustier, 2018). Furthermore, the 
impacts depend on the product and specificities 
of the value chain. Positive impacts are more likely 
in export chains of high-value products than in 
domestic staple chains. This can be a major obstacle 
to alleviating poverty because millions of family 
farmers only participate in domestic staple chains. 
Finally, upgrading could increase income inequalities 
within food chains. The total value added increases 
with upgrading, but its distribution becomes less 
favourable to smallholders (Reardon et al., 2009, 
2012). When included, smallholders receive higher 
incomes in absolute value, but their share of the total 
value added within the chain generally decreases and 
income inequalities between smallholders and large 
agribusinesses increase. For example, the upgrading 
of the rice chain in Bangladesh made it possible to 
produce high-quality rice but decreased producer 
shares of the total value added from 69 percent to 
38 percent  (Reardon et al., 2012). A similar trend has 
been observed in Senegal, where the upgrading of 
the rice chain decreased the farmers’ share of the 
total value added from 60 percent to 37 percent (cf. 
Figure 19). In Nicaragua, the supermarket revolution 
in vegetable chains has highlighted a similar trend 
(cf. Box 10). There are, however, some exceptions, 
such as in Vietnam where farmers’ organisations 
have contributed to improving the quality of lychee 
(Moustier et al., 2010) and secured a 25 to 42 
percent increase in the total value added (Moustier, 
2009). These inequalities seem to differ from one 
type of food chain to another. Value may be more 
concentrated at the wholesale level when products 
can be stored rather than in chains comprising a few 
intermediaries and supplying perishable products. ●
 
BOX 10 
do supermarkets in nicaragua strengthen 
inequalities?1
In Nicaragua, horticultural production (tomatoes, green pep-
pers, lettuce and cabbage) is conducted by farms with diffe-
rent structures. Around two-thirds are rainfed farms and the 
others are irrigated. Among irrigated farms, half are large, 
farming more than seven hectares. Before the 1990s, most 
of these farms marketed products in traditional value chains, 
made up of small collectors and retailers. Then two companies 
upgraded horticultural value chains by developing supermar-
kets: the national company La Colonia and the international 
company Walmart. In 2009, there were 65 supermarkets in 
Nicaragua. These supermarkets often used contracts to pur-
chase horticultural products and set quality standards. They 
purchased horticultural products from those farmers that of-
fered the lowest transaction and procurement costs. As a re-
sult, they preferred sourcing from the largest farms or from 
cooperatives, and from farms representing the lowest trans-
portation costs. Supermarkets also preferred sourcing from 
irrigated farms, because they could continuously supply pro-
ducts throughout the year, in contrast to rainfed farms. 
As a result, farmers located in very remote areas and growing 
rainfed produce on small farms were much less likely to be 
included in the upgraded chain. Furthermore, the supermar-
kets specified quality standards, defined in terms of variety, 
size, colouration, cleanliness, damage and weight. On average, 
supermarkets accepted 70 percent of the total production and 
rejected the remaining 30 percent. In contrast, the traditional 
value chain bought produce of all sizes and grades and pro-
vided outlets for produce rejected by supermarkets. Further-
more, the study has shown that farmers marketing to super-
markets did not receive higher prices than in the traditional 
value chain. La Colonia purchased vegetables at prices simi-
lar to those of traditional markets. Walmart even purchased 
tomatoes at prices 35 percent below the market price since 
Walmart’s prices were steady compared to traditional mar-
kets. This price might, however, include an overly expensive 
insurance against price risk.
1. Based on Michelson, Reardon and Perez, 2012.
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Figure 19: Distribution of value added in traditional and 
upgraded rice chains in Senegal. 
Source: Soullier, 2017.
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